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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
In other words, there had been no showing of extreme hardship to
the minority if the sale were reasonably deferred: the "equities"
of the litigation appeared to be with the trustees. Viewed thus,
the syllabus may seem broader than the record in this litigation
actually requires. Certainly it is unlikely that the informed discretion of the chancellor in corporation reorganization work may
be wholly excluded by a myriad of paragraphs in the indenture.
The present decision accordingly is one of considerable import
for corporate bondholders. It has settled the issue of foreclosure
jurisdiction, and has indicated that a very strong showing must
be made before the terms of the bond issue may be disregarded
wholly. Thus the court has upheld an authority in the majority
bondholders, controlling the discretion of the trustees, where so
stipulated. Perhaps, a more definite ruling may soon be had on
the privilege of the minority to intervene in every case, agreements
to the contrary notwithstanding.

QUASI-CONTRACTS -

RECOVERY FOR MISTAKE OF LAW

-

SET-

TLEMENT OF DispuTm CLAIM. - At a prior time, action had been
begun against the present plaintiff, as receiver of an insolvent
bank, to compel him to pay over the entire depositor's claim of
a county. Believing that the county had priority over general
creditors by virtue of an earlier decision' and at the direction of
the commissioner of banking, plaintiff paid the claim in full. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that a county was
not entitled on these facts to preference over general creditors. 2
Plaintiff then sued to recover the overpayment on the ground
of mistake of law. Held, that there can be no recovery. Finnell v.
Peoples Bank of Keyser.3
The doctrine that money paid under a mistake of law cannot
be recovered is almost universally recognized.4 Before the nine' Woodyard v. Sayre, 90 W. Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689, 24 A. L. R. 1497 (1922).
2 Calhoun County Court v. Mathews, 99 W. Va. 483, 129 S. E. 399, 52 A.

L. R. 751 (1925).
a 182 S. E. 888 (W. Va. 1935).
4 Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469 (1802) ; Gaffney v. Stowers, 73 W. Va. 420,
80 S. E. 401 (1913); Shriver v. Garrison, 30 W. Va. 456, 4 S. E. 660 (1887);
Beard v. Beard, 25 W. Va. 486, 52 Am. Rep. 219 (1885): Haigh v. United
States Bldg. etc. Ass'n, 19 W. Va. 792 (1882); Mayor of Richmond v. Xudah,
5 Leigh 305 (Va. 1834); Cf. Burgess v. City of Cameron, 113 W. Va. 127,
166 S. E. 113 (1932); and for a compilation of cases with annotations, see
(1911) 19 Ann. Cas. 794; (1926) 42 A. L. R. 305; (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1381;
(1928) 53 A. L. R. 949; (1929) 63 A. L. R. 1346; (1931) 75 A. L. R. 658;
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teenth century no distinction between mistake of law and mistake
of fact is to be found.' On the contrary, early authorities both at
law5 and in equity 7 allowed recovery indiscriminately. Lord
Ellenborough s in 1802 inadvertently established the rule denying
recovery in the case of mistake of law :9 clearly he was unfamiliar
with the past decisions and misapprehended the function of the
maxim, ignorantiajuris non excusat.10 Moreover, within ten years,
Ellenborough reversed this decision, and held a mistake of law
sufficient ground for disregarding the cancellation of a deed;"
yet his ruling in the former case has become firmly entrenched in
12
the common law, although subject to much criticism.
Some courts have minimized the force of the general rule
by establishing numerous exceptions to its operation." Kentucky
and Connecticut by judicial decision have refused to recognize any
distinction between a mistake of law and one of fact.' 4 Six states
(1908) 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 183; (1910) 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 440; (1918)
21 R. 0. L. 143; (1929) 6 R. C. L. Supp. 1254; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (3d
ed. 1920) 2812.

53

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1581.

Hewer v. Bartholomew, Cro. Eliz. 614 (1598); Bonnel v. Foulke, 2 Sid.
4 (1657).
7 Turner v. Turner, 2 Rep. in Oh. 154 (1722); Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 2
Jac. & W. 205 (1730).
s In the case of Bilbie v. Lumley, supra n. 4, Lord Ellenborough asked
counsel if anyone knew of a case where recovery had been allowed for a mistake of law. The response indicated that neither he nor counsel were familiar
with the two cases cited, supra n. 6. Lord Ellenborough was preeminently a
criminal lawyer and a perusal of his holding shows that he misapprehended
a

the scope of the maxim, ignorantia juris noi e7cusat, because that doctrine

is applicable to the reformation and rescission of contracts, or recovery make
under a mistake, only when such contract or payment is tainted with illegality.
See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1581.
o By the great weight of authority at the present day as well as in the past
recovery is allowed under a mistake of fact. See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §

1581.

10 See supra n. 8.

11 Perrott v. Perrott, 14 East 423 (1811).
12 KEENER, QUAsI-CONTRACTS (1893) § 85; WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS
(1913) § 35; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1582; 7 COL. L. REv. 476 (1907);
24 GEo. L. J. 760 (1936); 21 HARv. L. REV. 225 (1908); 32 HAnv. L. REV.
283 (1919); 45 HARv. L. REV. 336 (1932).
13 See Note, 32 HARV. L. Rnv. 283 (1919). The exceptions may be classified

as follows: (1) mistake of foreign law has always been dealt with as a
mistake of fact; (2) public moneys erroneously disbursed are recoverable;
(3) money paid to trustee or court officers under mistake of law may not be

retained; (4) payments made under a void statute, or on reliance of a decision, later overruled must be returned. Only one case has been found supporting this exception. School Township v. State, 150 Ind. 168, 49 19. E. 961
(1898). Contra, Metzger v. Greiner, 9 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 364 (1906).
14 Bank v. Catlin, 82 Conn. 227, 73 At]. 3 (1909); Bronson v. Leibold, 87
Conn. 293, 87 Atl. 979 (1913); Supreme Council v. Fenwiek, 169 Ky. 269,

183 S.W. 906 (1916).
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permit recovery in both cases by statutory provisions. 15 Georgia
and South Carolina adhere to a metaphysical distinction whereby
recovery is permitted for mistake of law, though none is allowed
for ignorance of the law.16 No less an authority than Williston 7
contends that "it is impossible to coordinate the cases so as to produce satisfactory results, because the rule itself distinguishing
mistake of law from mistake of fact is founded on no sound
principle .... the only way for the law on the subject to obtain
uniformity and certainty is by the gradual broadening of the exceptions .... induced by the manifest injustice of the rule, until
they so far coalesce that courts will venture to put mistakes of
law and of fact on the same footing." One learned author"s maintains that there is in England at the present day, as well as in
France, Italy and Germany, no difference between the two classes
of cases.
West Virginia has inflexibly followed the rule that money
voluntarily paid under a claim of right, and with knovledge of
the facts by the person making payment, cannot be recovered back
on the ground that there was no liability to pay in the first instance. 9 It is at least arguable this is a sound "rule of thumb"
from a pragmatic approach, regardless of how unsatisfactory it
may appear from the historical or theoretical viewpoint. 0 Indeed,
most questions of law are doubtful: at least one school of juristic
thought takes the position that all law is but a prophecy of what
the courts will do in fact. 21 One possible rationale of the majority
rule is grounded upon public policy. It is apparent that questions
of mistake of fact lend themselves to proof because the facts of
a case must of necessity grow out of the particular transaction between the parties.2 2 On the other hand, a mistake of law can never
be confined within the narrow limits of a specific case; and a mis15 See CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 1578; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1926) § 4576; MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, 1921) § 7486; N. D. Comp. LAws
AN. (1913) § 5855; OKLA. COMP. STAT. ANN. (Bunn, 1921) § 5002; S. D.

ComP. LAws (1929)

§

822.

Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64 (1849); Lawrence v. Beaubien, 2 Bailey
623 (S.C. 1831).
16

17 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1581.

Stadden, Error of Law (1907) 7 COLd. L. Rlv. 476.
19 Finnell v. Peoples Baiik of Keyser, supra n.3; Gaffney v. Stowers, supra
n. 4; Shriver v. Garrison, supra n.4; Beard v. Beard, supra n. 4; Haigh v.
United States Bldg. etc. Ass'n, supra n. 4; Mayor of Richmond v. Judah,
supra n. 4; cf. Burgess v. City of Cameron, supra n. 4.
20 See 45 HARv. L. REv. 336 (1932).
21 Ibid..
is

22 Ibid.
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take of law is rarely, if ever, capable of proof. 23 Mental conviction
is prerequisite to a litigable mistake. Subjective evidence would
be patently unreliable in trying mental conviction as to a mistake of law. Thus it would seem that grave danger of fraud is
inescapable if recovery be permitted for mistake of law. There
may then be a justification behind such a rule analogous to that
behind the statute of frauds. Should the case arise where other
considerations outweigh the possibility of fraud, there would be
a reasonable ground for exception to the general rule.
The result reached in the principal case is satisfactory in the
light of the rule applicable to both mistakes of law and of fact,
to the effect that where payment has been made -without coercion
or mistake of fact, to satisfy an honest claim, however unenforceable, the giving up of such claim by the recipient is good consideration for a contract.24 However, were this decision to be based
purely on mistake of law, all other considerations being ignored,
the equities would rather tend toward permitting recovery in such
event.22 Even so, an overwhelming weight of authority supports
the holding of the instant case, - with the possible exception of a
26
single Indiana decision.
23 Ibid.
2
4 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

(1932) § 76; Shriver v. Garrison, supra n. 4.
25 In the absence of change of position or some other defense to recovery,
it would seem that, from the equitable standpoint, there would be no difference between allowing a recovery in this case and permitting it in another
case where therb had been a mistake of fact. Cf. W. VA. REv. CODE (1931)
c. 44, art. 4, § 13:

".

.

.

. if any personal representative, guardian, curator

or committee shall pay any debt, the recovery of which could be prevented by
reason of illegality of consideration, or lapse of time, or otherwise, when he
knows, or by the exercise of due diligence could ascertain, the facts by which
the same could be so prevented, no credit shall be allowed him therefor."
It has been held that it is the duty of any such persbn to defend all doubtful
demands against the estate. Hale v. White, 47 W. Va. 700, 35 S. E. 884
(1896).
Furthermore, it may be urged that other creditors are prejudiced by denying
recovery in this case. See W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 44, art. 4, § 73.
-O In the case of Center School Township v. State, 150 Ind. 168, 49 N. E.
961 (1898), which is closely analogous to the principal case, recovery for
mistake of law, growing out of a reversal of a prior decision of the same
court, was permitted. The court said, in the syllabus, "A decision of a court
of last resort is but an exposition of what the court construes the law to be,
and in overruling a former decision the court does not declare the overruled
decision to be bad law, but that it never was the law, and the court was
simply mistaken in regard to the law in its former decision; the first decision
is wholly obliterated, and the law as therein declared must be considered as
though it never existed, and that the law always has been as expounded by the
last decision."
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